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A recurring question in psychology and cognitive science concerns the expression of theories that
are internally consistent and testable. Natural language is unsatisfactory, as theoretical concepts and
mechanisms are not stated with sufficient precision (e.g., Newell et al., 1958; Newell and Simon,
1972; Farrell and Lewandowsky, 2010; Jones et al., 2014). Formal and, in particular, computational
models avoid the problems of vagueness and under-specification by defining the processes and
cognitive mechanisms that occur during a task. They additionally make quantitative and testable
predictions, not only about the link between input and output, but also about fine-grainedmeasures
such as response times and eye movements. Further, such models can perform complex tasks
and, when simulating learning, can use the statistical structure of the environment to help explain
behavior.
This Opinion article briefly reviews the extent to which computational modeling has been
used to develop theories accounting for the learning and use of chunks, schemata, and retrieval
structures. We use the following definitions. A chunk is a “meaningful unit of information built
from smaller pieces of information” (Gobet and Lane, 2012, p. 541), with the qualification that
this information should be of the same kind. A schema is “a cognitive structure for representing
and retrieving classes of typical situations for which a similar response is required of the learner”
(Lane et al., 2000, p. 776). Finally, a retrieval structure is “a set of retrieval cues [that] are organized
in a stable structure” (Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995, p. 216). We should point out that there exist
plenty of definitions for these terms, which is actually an issue for progress in our understanding.
For example, Richman et al. (1991) consider that a retrieval structure is a schema in long-term
memory. Even fuzzier is the concept of a “chunk.” For example, a chunk is a unit of declarative
memory in ACT-R (Anderson et al., 2004) and a unit of proceduralmemory in Soar (Newell, 1990),
with none of the two meanings corresponding to the definition provided above. For a discussion of
the multiple meanings of this term, see Gobet et al. (in revision).
THE PERILS OF USING VERBAL THEORIES
To illustrate the weaknesses of verbal theories, let us consider how Ericsson and Kintsch (1995)
applied their long-term working memory (LT-WM) theory to explain the results of Saariluoma’s
(1989) dictation task. Here, the experimenter dictated the content of a chess position, piece-by-
piece, at a rapid rate (typically, one piece every 2 s), and then participants had to reconstruct the
position. Saariluoma found that chess experts memorized the board positions taken from games
fairly well (more than 80%), but obtained weaker performance with random positions (no more
than 60%). Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) explained these results by proposing that strong chess
players have acquired a hierarchical retrieval structure corresponding to the 64 squares of a chess
board. This structure has two functions: first, it connects individual pieces to their respective
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squares, and, second, it allows pieces to be related to each other,
representing a position as an integrated hierarchical structure.
Thanks to this structure, it is possible to encode information
rapidly into long-term memory, and to link it with patterns and
schemata.
At first sight, this explanation looks plausible. However, when
LT-WM was implemented as a computational model, Gobet
(2000) found that recall ranged from 10 to 100% for both
game and random positions, depending on parameter settings—
essentially all possible outcomes. Being less specified with respect
to mechanisms and parameters, LT-WM predicts even more
possible outcomes, and is thus non-refutable, a serious problem
for a scientific theory.
Of course, it could be the case that Gobet (2000) made
incorrect theoretical choices in implementing LT-WM, in the
sense that his model did not correspond to what Ericsson and
Kintsch (1995) had inmind. Specifically, there exists an indefinite
number of possible models that satisfy the verbal description
they provided, and some may provide better results than the
model implemented by Gobet (2000). However, this is precisely
the point made by the authors highlighting the advantages of
computational modeling: not enough constraints are provided by
verbal theories, and thus too much freedom is left in the way they
can be interpreted.
A BRIEF REVIEW OF COMPUTER MODELS
Chunks
Although dominated by verbal theories, the literature includes a
number of computational models of chunking. Several models
have accounted for expert chess memory and perception (Ellis,
1973; Simon and Gilmartin, 1973; De Groot et al., 1996; Gobet
and Simon, 1996a,b; Saariluoma and Laine, 2001) and the use
of chunks for chess problem solving (Berliner and Campbell,
1984; Gobet and Jansen, 1994). Implicit learning has led to the
development of several models (Servan-Schreiber and Anderson,
1990; French et al., 2011; Lane and Gobet, 2012a; Perruchet
et al., 2014). Models have also been developed to account for
short-term memory experiments (Robinet et al., 2011; Mathy
and Feldman, 2012), spelling (Simon and Simon, 1973), alphabet
recitation (Klahr et al., 1983), and verbal learning (Feigenbaum
and Simon, 1984; Gobet et al., 2001). Mathematical models
have been developed to estimate the most efficient size of
chunks (Dirlam, 1972), the number of chunks necessary to
reach expertise (Simon and Gilmartin, 1973), or the amount of
monochrestic (single-use) knowledge held by experts (Chassy
and Gobet, 2011). Rabinovich et al. (2014) used non-linear
dynamics to develop a model of hierarchical chunking in the
brain.
Some of these models have led to important empirical
discoveries. For example, modeling with CHREST (Gobet and
Simon, 1996a,b) predicted that, contrary to a widely held opinion
at the time, chess experts should show superior memory recall
over weaker players even for random positions. To explain
this counter-intuitive prediction, Gobet and Simon argued that
a model with a larger number of chunks was more likely
to find, serendipitously, chunks in a random position than a
model with few chunks. The prediction was supported by a
meta-analysis of the available data as well as the collection of
new data. Interestingly, Vicente and Wang (1998) challenged
this explanation by arguing that the chess positions used in
the literature still contain constraints (e.g., there is only one
white King and at most eight black pawns). They argued that,
with positions where all pieces have the same likelihood of
being selected (“truly random positions”), the skill effect should
disappear. By contrast, simulations with CHREST predicted
that, again, there should be a reliable skill effect, albeit smaller
than with standard random positions, because the likelihood
to find a chunk fortuitously is smaller. The model’s predictions
were upheld (Gobet and Waters, 2003): not only did the
empirical data show a skill effect, but they also were close
to the absolute values predicted by the model. This result is
theoretically important, because the other mechanisms proposed
to explain experts’ superiority with game positions (e.g., high-
level knowledge, schemata, or retrieval structures) fail to explain
their superiority with random and fully random positions
(Gobet, 2015). It thus provides direct support for chunking
mechanisms. In addition, and importantly, the fact that new
predictions were made by a computational model and supported
empirically is important, since this rebuts a common criticism
that computational modeling only serves to fit data.
Schemata
Unfortunately, there has been little modeling work with respect
to schemata (Lane et al., 2000). CHREST is perhaps unique in
explaining the processes underpinning the learning and use of
schemata (called templates) in a variety of domains. Simulations
have been carried out in board games (Gobet and Simon, 2000;
Gobet, 2009; Bossomaier et al., 2012), diagrammatic reasoning
(Lane et al., 2001), implicit learning (Lane and Gobet, 2012a),
categorisation (Lane and Gobet, 2014), and agent modeling
(Lloyd-Kelly et al., 2014, 2015). When a broader definition of
a schema is used, work with neural networks (St. John and
McClelland, 1990) and Soar (Laird et al., 1987) address issues
related to schemata; Kintsch (1992) proposes some simulations
with respect to language.
Retrieval Structures
Overall, the least modeling research has been carried out on
retrieval structures. To our knowledge, the only models having
tackled this issue used chunking networks. Richman et al. (1995)
used EPAM-IV to simulate the growth of expertise in the digit-
span task, accounting for how an individual was able tomemorize
up to 106 digits dictated every second. The retrieval structure
used in their simulations consisted of digits at the bottom level,
chunks (e.g., running times) at the second level, super-groups
combining chunks at the third level, and super-group clusters
combining super-groups at the fourth level. Gobet (2013) used
CHREST to simulate how a chess master was able to memorize
several briefly presented chess boards simultaneously. In this
model, the retrieval structure consisted of the list of chess world
champions. In both cases, the retrieval structures were directly
based on the strategies used by the human participants.
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CONCLUSION
While a fair number of models have investigated chunking,
very little computational work has been devoted to schemata
and retrieval structures, although some informal theories exist.
This is regrettable, since schemata and retrieval structures are
key structures of the human mind, not least because they
link together various kinds of knowledge. Why are there so
few models? Possible answers include the lack of methodology
for developing models (but see Lane and Gobet, 2012b), the
technical skills and time required, the difficulty of deciding what
constitutes a good model (Roberts and Pashler, 2000), the poor
specification of current theories, and also the difficulty in finding
suitable data to model. Naively, one could argue that modeling
is not necessary, as data from neuroscience will answer all the
key questions in the long term. However, this is unlikely to be
the case. Data from neuroscience are actually inconsistent and
confusing (Uttal, 2011; Guida et al., 2012) and computational
models are necessary for making sense of them (Gobet, 2014)!
A striking result of this review is the number and breadth of
coverage of models for the chunking network family, whose main
representatives are EPAM and CHREST. This should not really
come as a surprise and reflects the influence of Herbert Simon,
whowas one of the first to advocate chunking as a keymechanism
of human cognition (e.g., Feigenbaum and Simon, 1962; Simon,
1974) and also carried out influential empirical research on
retrieval structures and schemata (Larkin et al., 1980; Gobet and
Simon, 1996c). He also studied topics, most notably expertise in
chess, for which chunking comes as a natural explanation (e.g.,
Simon and Chase, 1973). Finally, chunks, schemata, and retrieval
structures dovetail with his hypothesis that human cognition can
be described as a physical symbol system (Simon and Newell,
1976), where symbols are discrete units.
Beyond historical reasons, chunking network models offer
several theoretical advantages, including: (a) they provide
learning mechanisms; (b) they are organized hierarchically; (c)
they include time parameters, making it possible to make precise
predictions; (d) they are efficient and scale up (learning hundreds
of thousands of chunks can be done in a few minutes; (e)
they provide an architecture seamlessly implementing chunks,
schemata and retrieval structures; and (f) they can be (and have
been) used to account for phenomena in different psychological
provinces, including perception, memory, problem solving and
decision making, and language.
Without the use of formal models, in particular computational
models, progress in understanding chunks, retrieval structures,
and schemata will be slow, if possible at all. By highlighting
the strengths of computational modeling and the weaknesses of
verbal theorizing, we hope to have encouraged other researchers
to develop computational models accounting for each of these
structures and how they work together.
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